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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
GEORGE K. THOMPSON and FRtANK S.
MARKHAM, co-partnership doing business under the firm name and style of
THOMPSON-MARKHAM COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF

No. 6221

UTAH, WILLIAM M. KNERR, Chairman
and member of said The Industrial Commission of Utah, and 0. F. McSHANE and
FRANK A. JUGLER1 members of said
The Industrial Commission of Utah, and
E. A. HODGES, State Metal Mine Inspector,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF
GEO. W. WORTHEN,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Received copy of within Brief this __________________________________________day of
April, 1940.
Attorneys for Defendants
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MARKHAM, co-partnership doing business under the firm name and style of
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Plaintiffs,
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, WILLIAM M. KNERR, Chairman
and member of said The Industrial Commission of Utah, and 0. F. McSHANE and
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The Industrial Commission of Utah, and
E. A. HODGES, State Metal Mine Inspector,
Defendants.
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At Page 6 of defendants' brief counsel observed that:
"Numerous tunnels have been driven in the mountains for purposes other than mining, and yet the quesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion is raised in this Court for the first time. It is
reasonable to suppose that the persons who made these
tunnels felt that they were amenable to the eight hour
law and complied with the same, otherwise it would
seem that the matter, long ago, would have been
brought before the Courts."
We submit that no such presumption can be indulged.
But, assuming, without admitting, that others have complied with this eight hour law, their conduct can have no
binding effect upon these plaintiffs or upon this Court.
Counsel next observe that Section 103-1-2 Revised
Statutes of Utah, abolishes the common rule of strict construction with respect to penal statutes. We recognize that
the Court is concerned only with ascertaining the Legislative intent. But we do submit that penal statutes as stated
in plaintiffs' brief will be interpreted as applying only to
such classes of employment as come clearly within the
terms of the Act.
In Volumes 59 C. J. Section 661, Page 1119-21 the author uses this language:
"In some jurisdictions, the rule of strict construction of penal statutes has been abolished by statute,
and in these jurisdictions, they may be liberally construed, according to the fair import of their terms with
a view to effect their object and promote justice . . .
Nevertheless, the courts in these jurisdictions will not
enlarge penal statutes by implication or intendment beyond the fair meaning of the language used, nor will
they be held to include other offenses and persons than
those which are clearly described and provided, for . . .
In order to enforce a penalty against a person, he must
be brought clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the statute; and if there is a fair doubt as to
whether the act charged is embraced in the prohibition,
that doubt will be resolved in favor of accused ... "
We believe there is no reasonable basis upon which to
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include plaintiffs within the prohibition of the statute in
question. Our further position is, that if there is a question
as to the statute extending to plaintiffs, any doubt on that
point must be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.
An examination of Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, Section 7892, discloses that our Section 103-1-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 was adopted from California Penal Code
Section 4 which reads as follows:
"The rule of the common law that penal statutes
are to be strictly construed has no application to this
code. All its provisions are to be construed according
to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect
their objects and promote justice."
However, in the case of Ex parte Twing, cited in plaintiffs' brief at Page 13, the California Court held that penal
statutes must be construed to reach no further than their
words, and that no person can be made subject to them by
implication.
The California Court in the case of Miller v. Salomon,
281 Pac. 89 cited on Page 1119 of Volume 59 C. J. held that
in determining the application of a penal statute it will be
given a strict construction. In that case the Court, at Page
89 of the Pacific Report said:
"The statute being a penal statute when under consideration as here, will receive a strict construction."
Our view is that the rule of liberal construction as to
penal statutes does not extend to the point of denying to
one charged with the commission of a crime, the benefit of
a doubt as to whether or not he comes within the class
intended to be charged.
Penal Laws of New York, Section 21 abolished the
common law rule of strict construction and provided that
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penal statutes must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the object of the law.
In Wallace v. Walsh (N. Y.) 25 N. E. 1076, 11 L. R. A.
166, the Court said at Page 169 of the L. R. A. Report:
"The Courts have uniformly refused to extend a
penal act beyond the strict letter of the Statute in order
to bring a case within its meaning which was not clearly embraced in its letter."
In the case of City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas and
Electric Corporation, (N. Y.) 134 N. E. 828, it was held
that
"Strained and forced construction is not permissible to extend to doubtful situations the prohibition of
a penal statute."
In the case of People v. Hemleb, 111 N.Y. Supplement
690, it was held that the rule requiring words of a statute
to be construed in connection with the other words thereof
is "Especially applicable in the construction of criminal
statutes, for such statutes can not be strained in construction to make out a crime."
The statutes of Oklahoma provide for the same rule
of construction as our statute.
It was provided in Compiled Laws of Oklahoma, 1909,
Section 2027, as follows:
"The rule· of common law that penal statutes are
to be strictly construed has no application to this code.
All its provisions are to be construed according to the
fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its object and to promote justice."
In McDonald v. State, (Okla.) 15 Pac. 2nd 149, the
Court, at Page 150, said:
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"It is a fundamental princple of criminal law that
there can be no constructive offenses, and statutes are
not to be enlarged by construction or extended by inference to cover acts not clearly within both the letter
and the spirit of a penal statute."
In State v. Barnett, (Okla.) 69 Pac. 2nd 77, the Court

said:
"It is a well settled rule that a penal statute must
be construed with such strictness as to carefully guard
the rights of the accused and at the same time preserve
the obvious intention of the Legislature . . . "
The Oklahoma Court in the last mentioned case quoted
approvingly from Connally \'. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126 as follows:
"A statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessar.Hy guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application violates the first essential of
due process of law."
In the Connally case, the Supreme Court of the United
States, at Page 128 of the 46th S. Ct. Report, speaking
through Mr. Justice Sutherland said:
"The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful can not be left to conjecture. The citizen can
not be held to answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will
reasonably admit of different constructions."
We submit that the statute in question, even if this
Court had never interpreted the words "underground mines
or workings" and if the Legislature had not re-enacted the
identical words in later statutes and revisions, would be
sufficiently uncertain to reasonably admit of different constructions; but in the light of the judicial interpretation and
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the Legislative acquiescence therein, we submit that the
term "underground mines or workings" restricts the language to underground workings connected with mining.
Respectfully submitted,
GEO. W. WORTHEN
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